Moral realism, disagreement, and conceptual ethics

Area of Science:

• Moral philosophy
• Metaethics
• Philosophy of language

Background:

• Moral disagreement poses a significant challenge to moral realism.
• Existing explanations often rely on non-cognitivist frameworks.
• The Morality-As-Cooperation (MAC) and Concepts-As-Tools (CAT) hypotheses offer alternative perspectives on moral language.

Purpose of the Study:

• To re-evaluate the metaethical significance of moral disagreement for moral realism.
• To integrate the MAC and CAT hypotheses to analyze moral disagreements.
• To propose a novel realist account of genuine moral disagreement.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of moral language.
• Integration of the Morality-As-Cooperation (MAC) hypothesis with the Concepts-As-Tools (CAT) hypothesis.
• Examination of how linguistic disputes shape moral cooperation.

Main Results:

• The combined MAC-CAT view reframes moral disagreements as often being linguistic disputes.
• This perspective weakens skeptical arguments stemming from moral disagreement.
• It provides a realist explanation for the apparent genuineness of moral disagreements.

Conclusions:

• Moral disagreements may not undermine moral realism as significantly as previously thought.
• The MAC-CAT framework offers a robust alternative to non-cognitivist explanations.
• Understanding moral language as a tool for cooperation illuminates the nature of moral disputes.