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Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
Bettina Klaus1, Alexandru Nichifor2
1Faculty of Business and Economics, Internef, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
Abstract:
We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665-684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering such that is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and .
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