Dynamical analysis of evolutionary public goods game on signed networks

Xiaowen Zhong1, Guo Huang1, Ningning Wang1

  • 1School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, 100875 Beijing, China.

Summary

This study explores cooperation in evolutionary public goods games on signed networks. Negative edges diversify cooperation, leading to three distinct fixation probability patterns under a strong mistrust mechanism.

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