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Evolutionary multigame with conformists and profiteers based on dynamic complex networks.

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Summary
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This study explores how conformists and profiteers influence cooperation in evolutionary games with multiple rounds. Introducing player similarity into strategy updates reveals complex dynamics in cooperation evolution and network structures.

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Area of Science:

  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Complex networks
  • Social behavior analysis

Background:

  • Traditional evolutionary game models often assume players are purely profit-seeking.
  • Recent research indicates players can be conformists, influencing group decision-making.
  • Existing models lack consideration for multiple games and player type diversity.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate the impact of conformists and profiteers on cooperation evolution in multi-game scenarios.
  • To introduce novel strategy-updating rules incorporating player similarity.
  • To analyze the interplay between strategy updates, player type transitions, and network structure evolution.

Main Methods:

  • Developed an evolutionary game model on complex networks.
  • Implemented two distinct strategy-updating rules accounting for conformists and profiteers.
  • Introduced a player similarity metric into the strategy-updating mechanism.
  • Simulated the model on scale-free and regular networks.

Main Results:

  • Demonstrated that conformists and profiteers significantly affect cooperation dynamics.
  • Observed complex evolutionary processes including strategy and type transitions.
  • Showcased the dynamic evolution of network structures influenced by player behavior.
  • Validated the model's effectiveness through simulations on different network topologies.

Conclusions:

  • Player type (conformist vs. profiteer) and similarity are crucial factors in cooperation evolution.
  • The proposed model offers a more realistic framework for understanding group decision-making.
  • Findings provide insights into strategy and network dynamics in social interactions.