Conscientious objection and the referral requirement as morally permissible moral mistakes

Some contributions to the current literature on conscience objection in healthcare posit the notion that the requirement to refer patients to a non-objecting provider is a morally questionable undertaking in need of explanation. The issue is that providing a referral renders those who conscientiously object to being involved in a particular intervention complicit in its provision. This essay seeks to engage with such claims and argues that referrals can be construed in terms of what Harman calls morally permissible moral mistakes. I go on to suggest that one might frame the (in)actions of those who exercise the right of non-participation generated by the claim to conscientiously object in similar terms; they can also be considered morally permissible moral mistakes. Finally, and given that the arguments already advanced involve simultaneously looking at the same issue from competing ethical perspectives, I offer some brief remarks that support viewing conscientious objection as an ethicopolitical device.