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The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
Published on: October 20, 2022
Collusion-Resistant Worker Set Selection for Transparent and Verifiable Voting
Matthieu Bettinger1, Lucas Barbero1, Omar Hasan1
1University of Lyon, INSA-Lyon, 69621 Villeurbanne, France.
Abstract:
Collusion occurs when multiple malicious participants of a distributed protocol work together to sabotage or spy on honest participants. decentralized protocols often rely on a subset of participants called workers for critical operations. Collusion between workers can be particularly harmful to the security of the protocol. We propose two protocols that select a subset of workers from the set of participants such that the probability of the workers colluding together is minimized. Our first solution is a decentralized protocol that randomly selects workers in a verifiable manner without any trusted entities. The second solution is an algorithm that uses a social graph of participants and community detection to select workers that are socially distant in order to reduce the probability of collusion. We present our solutions in the context of a decentralized voting protocol proposed by Schiedermeier et al. (A transparent referendum protocol with immutable proceedings and verifiable outcome for trustless networks, Springer, Cham, 2019) that guarantees transparency and verifiability. Enabling collusion-resistance in order to ensure democratic voting is clearly of paramount importance thus the voting protocol provides a suitable use case for our solutions.
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