Social relationship adjustments within the same sex promote marital bliss

Parental care is essential for biological systems. Marital bliss is one of the ideal paradigms for parental care, in which males contribute in raising offspring and females require a courtship time. Yet marital bliss state is neither Nash equilibrium nor Pareto optimum for the classic Battle of the Sexes. It thus leads to a gap between evolutionary theory and marital bliss. Previous works concentrate on the pairwise interactions between the two sexes to fill this gap, such as the courtship time and encounter rate. The social relationships within the same sex, however, receives much less attention. Here we investigate how social relationships within the same sex change marital bliss by introducing the coevolution of strategy and social network. Based on the time scale separation, it is found that a symmetric game is emergent via social adjustments within each sex, and the evolutionary outcome is determined by the interplay between the emergent symmetric game and the Battle of the Sexes. We find that marital bliss can be promoted when males are rational (strong selection limit) and females are irrational (weak selection limit); the stable Coy-Coy social relationships both stabilize and speed up marital bliss; the general criterion of stabilizing marital bliss for arbitrary imitation function are found, which are verified by simulations. Furthermore, the emergent symmetric games are insightful for determining whether the stable marital bliss is global stable. Our work provides an alternative avenue to facilitate marital bliss, which can be applied for general asymmetric games on dynamical networks.