Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game.

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Public Health

Background:

• Pandemics present social dilemmas: individual isolation for public good versus freeriding.
• The impact of pandemic-specific incentives and social context on this dilemma is unclear.

Purpose of the Study:

• Investigate individual decisions to self-isolate during a pandemic using a game-theoretical approach.
• Analyze how people respond to social norms and collective risk in a pandemic context.

Main Methods:

• Utilized a novel iterated multiplayer game simulating pandemic decision-making.
• Employed a variation of the strategy method to assess beliefs about others' self-isolation.

Main Results:

• Individuals largely adhere to social norms, resisting freeriding when others isolate.
• People poorly manage exponential growth, only isolating sufficiently when lockdowns are imminent.
• Collective risk increases self-isolation, despite a stochastic link to lockdowns.
• Players underestimate others' self-isolation and underreport social influence on their own behavior.

Conclusions:

• Self-isolation behavior is influenced by social norms and perceived collective risk.
• Misperceptions of others' behavior and poor handling of exponential growth pose challenges for pandemic control.
• Findings have implications for public health messaging and policy during health crises.