[Het spook risicoselectie; ggz onverzekerbaar in huidig stelsel]

The Dutch health care system is a hybrid mix of public and market oriented elements. The market orientation harbours strong financial incentives for health insurance companies to select for the most healthy, least costly insurees. This is countered by an elaborate financial compensation for high risk, more costly health care users. Dysfunctioning of the compensatory financial mechanisms would render the mental health sector uninsurable.

To test the risk-compensatory mechanisms for mental health care in the Netherlands and to discuss consequences of malfunctioning.

We used governmental data to study: the distribution of mental health costs, the total mental health expenditures that are redirected to compensate insurance companies, and the accuracy of this compensation. The consequences of putative inaccuracies are discussed.

0.8% of the insured (all Dutch citizens are insured) are responsible for 66% of the mental health care costs. To compensate insurance companies for unequal distribution of costs, 3.9 billion euros were redirected. This compensation is based on inaccurate predictions of future health care costs of individual patients. The consequence is that insurance companies run a loss on every patient that uses mental health care. This loss is directly proportional to the amount of care used and therefore highest in patients with severe mental illness.

Due to inaccurate redirection of mental health-care costs, a strong financial incentive is in place to avoid investing in mental health care. Under prevailing regulations, mental health is de facto uninsurable in the Netherlands. This affects especially patients with the most severe and complex mental illness.