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Lesser-Evil Justifications: A Reply to Frowe.

Kerah Gordon-Solmon¹, Theron Pummer²

¹Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, KY16 9AL Fife UK.

Law and Philosophy

|September 19, 2022

Summary

This study challenges Helen Frowe's argument on lesser-evil justifications, asserting that agents must almost always act on these justifications. It defends the traditional view that such justifications typically expand, rather than restrict, permissible actions.

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Area of Science:

Moral Philosophy
Ethics
Justification Theory

Background:

The concept of lesser-evil justification allows contravening rights to prevent significant harm.
Non-consequentialist orthodoxy posits that these justifications expand permissible actions.
Helen Frowe controversially argues that agents are almost always obligated to act on lesser-evil justifications.

Purpose of the Study:

To refute Helen Frowe's central argument regarding lesser-evil justifications.
To present a positive case supporting the non-consequentialist orthodox view on justification.

Main Methods:

Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
Critical examination of Frowe's ethical framework.
Development of counterarguments to Frowe's claims.

Main Results:

The study refutes Frowe's flagship argument against the traditional understanding of lesser-evil justifications.
Evidence suggests that lesser-evil justifications typically do not eliminate permissible options.

Conclusions:

The non-consequentialist orthodox view, where lesser-evil justifications expand options, is upheld.
Frowe's claim that agents must almost always act on these justifications is rejected.
Further support is provided for the idea that ethical justifications generally enhance, not restrict, agency.