P/Key: PUF based second factor authentication.

Area of Science:

• Cybersecurity
• Cryptography
• Hardware Security

Background:

• Time-based one-time password (TOTP) systems store shared secrets vulnerable to server compromise.
• Existing hash-chain protocols face client-side latency and limited one-time password (OTP) generation.
• Server compromise in traditional systems allows attackers to obtain client secrets.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel second-factor authentication protocol resistant to server compromise and physical attacks.
• To address the limitations of existing hash-chain based protocols, specifically latency and OTP generation limits.
• To enhance the security and efficiency of authentication mechanisms using Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).

Main Methods:

• Utilizing Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for secure storage of client secrets on the server.
• Implementing a protocol where PUFs prevent attackers from obtaining client secret seeds even if the server is compromised.
• Incorporating a mechanism to protect client secrets from physical and side-channel attacks on the server.

Main Results:

• The proposed protocol prevents attackers from generating valid OTPs post-server compromise.
• Client secrets remain secure against physical and side-channel attacks targeting the server.
• The protocol eliminates client-side delays in one-time password generation, improving user experience.

Conclusions:

• Physically Unclonable Functions offer a robust solution for secure secret storage in second-factor authentication.
• The proposed PUF-based protocol significantly enhances security and efficiency compared to existing methods.
• This approach provides a more resilient and user-friendly authentication system against diverse threats.