Regulating genetic engineering guided by human dignity, not genetic essentialism.

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Genetics
• Political Philosophy

Background:

• The regulation of human genetic engineering in liberal democracies is complex.
• The term "human dignity" is frequently used but lacks a clear definition, hindering its utility as a regulatory principle.
• Existing debates often rely on "genetic essentialism," the idea that the human genome possesses inherent moral status.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critique the concept of genetic essentialism in the context of human genetic engineering.
• To propose an alternative framework for understanding human dignity.
• To outline a method for regulating human genetic engineering based on this new framework.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical critique of genetic essentialism.
• Conceptual analysis of "dignity" and "decisional autonomy."
• Proposal for a deliberative model involving public and expert input.

Main Results:

• Genetic essentialism is deemed an inadequate basis for regulating human genetic engineering or defining human rights.
• Human dignity is reconceptualized as the "decisional autonomy" of future persons.
• A model for principled agreement on configuring future persons' decisional autonomy is presented.

Conclusions:

• Decisional autonomy offers a more robust and actionable principle for guiding human genetic engineering regulation than "human dignity" or "genetic essentialism."
• Public deliberation, informed by medical and bioethical expertise, can establish guidelines for genetic engineering that respect future persons' autonomy.
• This approach provides a path toward ethical governance of human genetic engineering.