Resilient Output Formation-Tracking of Heterogeneous Multiagent Systems Against General Byzantine Attacks: A...

This work solves the countermeasure design problems of distributed resilient output time-varying formation-tracking (TVFT) of heterogeneous multiagent systems (MASs) against general Byzantine attacks (GBAs). Inspired by the concept of Digital Twin, a hierarchical protocol equipped with a twin layer (TL) is proposed, which decouples the above problem into the defense against Byzantine edge attacks (BEAs) on the TL and the defense against Byzantine node attacks (BNAs) on the cyber-physical layer (CPL). First, a secure TL with respect to (w.r.t.) the high-order leader dynamics is designed, which achieves resilient estimation against BEAs. A trusted-node strategy against BEAs is proposed, which promotes network resilience by protecting almost the smallest fraction of crucial nodes on the TL. It is proven that strongly (2f+1) -robustness w.r.t. the above trusted nodes is sufficient for the resilient estimation performance of the TL. Second, a decentralized adaptive and chattering-free controller against potentially unbounded BNAs is designed on the CPL. This controller has the merit of uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence and an assignable exponential decay rate when converging into the above UUB bound. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first to achieve resilient output TVFT against GBAs, rather than under GBAs. Finally, the practicability and validity of this new hierarchical protocol are illustrated via a simulation example.