Epistemic Injustice and Nonmaleficence

Area of Science:

• Medical Ethics
• Philosophy of Medicine
• Clinical Practice

Background:

• Epistemic injustice is increasingly recognized in medical ethics for analyzing healthcare issues.
• Limited attention has been given to the conceptual relationship between epistemic injustice and physicians' professional duties.

Purpose of the Study:

• To examine the conceptual conflict between testimonial injustice and physicians' duty of nonmaleficence.
• To argue for actively combating testimonial injustice in healthcare based on professional conduct.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical analysis of Fricker's concept of testimonial injustice against Beauchamp and Childress's definition of nonmaleficence.
• Examination of epistemic and non-epistemic harms resulting from testimonial injustice.
• Illustration using case examples from fibromyalgia syndrome literature.

Main Results:

• Testimonial injustice conflicts with the physician's duty of nonmaleficence, leading to both epistemic and non-epistemic harms.
• Non-epistemic harms represent a failure in the physician's due care process, causing wrongful harm to patients.
• Fibromyalgia syndrome cases exemplify how testimonial injustice results in maleficent practice.

Conclusions:

• The principle of nonmaleficence is insufficient on its own to fully address epistemic injustice in healthcare.
• Nonmaleficence provides a crucial starting point for tackling epistemic injustice in clinical encounters.
• Combating testimonial injustice is essential for upholding professional conduct and patient well-being.