Contrasting two models of utilitarian reasoning.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Moral Psychology
• Neuroscience

Background:

• Dual process models link utilitarian judgment to cognitive control and non-utilitarian judgment to emotion.
• The two-dimensional model distinguishes utilitarian choices into instrumental harm and impartial beneficence.
• Both models offer frameworks for understanding moral decision-making.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate hypotheses derived from dual process and two-dimensional models of moral cognition.
• To investigate utilitarian reasoning in neurologically healthy older adults.
• To examine conflicts between utilitarianism and common-sense morality.

Main Methods:

• Preregistered hypotheses were tested using a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults.
• Participants' moral judgments were assessed in relation to emotionality and cognitive control.
• Dilemmas focused on agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights.

Main Results:

• Higher emotionality correlated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = -0.12, p < .001).
• Partial support was found for the two-dimensional model; judgments on agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated.
• Both were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008).

Conclusions:

• Findings support elements of both dual process and two-dimensional models of utilitarian judgment.
• A revised two-dimensional model incorporating impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms is proposed.
• Moral cognition appears influenced by both emotional and cognitive factors, particularly in conflict domains.