Co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norm

Area of Science:

• Social Sciences
• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory

Background:

• Social norms emerge from shared expectations about behavior.
• Understanding the co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norms is crucial.
• Mechanisms driving norm formation and adherence remain complex.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the interplay between conditional cooperation and social norm emergence.
• To model how diverse agents' expectations and conformity influence cooperation in a public goods game.
• To explore the impact of varying contribution costs and initial cooperation levels on norm dynamics.

Main Methods:

• Agent-based modeling of a repeated public goods game.
• Simulation of agents with diverse conditional expectations and norm conformity sensitivity.
• Analysis of how psychic costs, contribution costs, and group cooperation levels affect agent behavior.

Main Results:

• Agents with random expectations can adapt to lower expectations and moderate conformity under high initial cooperation and reduced costs.
• Increased contribution costs amplify responses to norm enforcement but do not guarantee higher cooperation.
• Population diversity and accounting for empirical/normative expectations provide deeper insights.

Conclusions:

• Conditional cooperation and social norms dynamically co-evolve.
• Agent adaptation is influenced by initial conditions, costs, and group dynamics.
• Models incorporating expectation diversity offer valuable perspectives on social norm emergence.