Putting the "Decision" in Ramsey's "Theories"

Frank Ramsey's philosophy of science is considered abstruse due to the incompleteness and difficulty of his paper "Theories". This has not prevented various authors from arguing that Ramsey is committed to meaning holism for scientific theories, and that his philosophy of science is anti-realist but anti-reductionist. However, it is unclear exactly how meaning holism works for Ramsey, and how he can be both anti-realist and anti-reductionist. I argue that clarity can be gained on both issues by examining Ramsey's philosophy of science through a reconstruction of his decision theory compatible with his later philosophical beliefs. I develop an account of how credences can be formed over singular, theoretical propositions despite those propositions being fictions. Credences are ultimately measured by preferences over conditionals whose antecedents are the verification conditions of theoretical propositions and outcomes are elements of a privileged partition on an agent's possibility space induced by the language of the theory. Those verification conditions are the observational elements formed from the unions of this induced partition. Meaning holism is explained as the sensitivity of theoretical propositions to their verification conditions. And anti-realism and anti-reductionism can be maintained due to theoretical propositions forming a finer partition of possibility space than observational propositions, which prevents the former from being truth-functions of the latter.