Cooperation with dynamic asymmetric evaluation in complex networks from a risk perspective

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Network Science

Background:

• Strategy selection involves betrayal risk, leading to irrational tendencies that influence cooperation.
• The precise mechanisms linking risk perception and cooperation remain unclear.

Purpose of the Study:

• To extend the classic evolutionary game model on complex networks to understand risk perception and cooperation.
• To investigate the interplay between strategy imitation and payoff evaluation, considering dynamic adjustment and irrational assessment.

Main Methods:

• Extended evolutionary game model on complex networks.
• Incorporated probability distortion in imitative reference point selection and asymmetric psychological utility.
• Utilized Monte Carlo simulations to analyze emergent cooperation.

Main Results:

• Individual irrational cognition, induced by strategy selection risk, promotes cooperative behavior.
• Risk sensitivity in psychological utility significantly moderates cooperation.
• Network topology (heterogeneity, clustering) and initial states impact cooperation emergence.

Conclusions:

• Irrational cognition can foster cooperation in risky environments.
• Network structure and individual risk sensitivity are key factors in regulating group cooperation.
• Findings offer insights for managing cooperation among irrational agents in risky situations.