Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual...

In health insurance markets with regulated competition, regulators face the challenge of preventing risk selection. This paper provides a framework for analyzing the scope (i.e., potential actions by insurers and consumers) and incentives for risk selection in such markets. Our approach consists of three steps. First, we describe four types of risk selection: (a) selection by consumers in and out of the market, (b) selection by consumers between high- and low-value plans, (c) selection by insurers via plan design, and (d) selection by insurers via other channels such as marketing, customer service, and supplementary insurance. In a second step, we develop a conceptual framework of how regulation and features of health insurance markets affect the scope and incentives for risk selection along these four dimensions. In a third step, we use this framework to compare nine health insurance markets with regulated competition in Australia, Europe, Israel, and the United States.