Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner's dilemma

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Computational Social Science

Background:

• Players dissatisfied with payoffs may imitate neighbors' strategies.
• Learning success is often proportional to effort invested.
• Strategy updates can involve costs, influencing player decisions.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a two-stage strategy update rule incorporating learning costs.
• To investigate how learning costs and updating willingness affect cooperation.
• To analyze these dynamics in both well-mixed and structured populations.

Main Methods:

• Agent-based modeling simulating strategy updates.
• Analysis of a two-stage update rule with learning costs.
• Examination of homogeneous and heterogeneous updating willingness.

Main Results:

• In well-mixed populations, reduced willingness or increased cost prolongs cooperation.
• Heterogeneous willingness with higher aspiration/cost promotes cooperation.
• In structured populations, moderate costs benefit cooperators; reduced willingness broadens cooperation parameters.

Conclusions:

• Paid strategy learning dynamics are complex and influenced by learning costs and willingness to update.
• Cooperation can be promoted through strategic adjustments in learning costs and updating willingness.
• Findings contribute to understanding cooperation in evolutionary game theory.