Evolution of cooperation under threshold public goods game.

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Social Dilemmas

Background:

• Collective risk social dilemmas arise when cooperation fails to meet group targets, leading to lost collective interests.
• Self-organizing behavior can exacerbate these losses, while government intervention may enhance collective interests.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate cooperation evolution in threshold public goods games under self-organization and government intervention scenarios.
• To analyze the impact of threshold dynamics on cooperation and defection in a well-mixed population.

Main Methods:

• Utilized evolutionary game theory modeling within a threshold public goods game framework.
• Analyzed replication dynamics in a well-mixed population considering two distinct intervention strategies.

Main Results:

• Introduction of a threshold creates complex dynamics with two interior equilibria.
• Increasing thresholds under self-organization is a double-edged sword, potentially increasing cooperation but also defection risk.
• Increasing thresholds under government intervention significantly promotes cooperation.
• Larger group sizes generally favor free-riding behavior.
• Greater impact on collective interest positively correlates with cooperation promotion.

Conclusions:

• Government intervention is crucial for initiating cooperation when initial cooperators are few.
• Self-organizing behavior is more effective in attracting cooperators when initial cooperation levels are high.
• Findings offer insights for addressing global challenges like climate change and environmental degradation.