Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Contrasting epistemological (decoding extrinsic inputs) and ontological (intrinsic states) information theories.
• Highlighting limitations of ontological theories in explaining consciousness.
• Identifying animal brains as the only known conscious systems.

Purpose of the Study:

• To contrast epistemological and ontological information theories.
• To argue that epistemological information processing is essential for consciousness.
• To propose a framework for understanding consciousness in animal brains.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis and theoretical argumentation.
• Contrastive analysis of information theories.
• Examination of the role of information decoding in biological systems.

Main Results:

• Ontological information theories fail to account for consciousness.
• Epistemological information processing, specifically decoding extrinsic inputs, is central to consciousness in animal brains.
• Consciousness evolved to provide an evaluative experience for goal-directed behavior.

Conclusions:

• Consciousness arises from specific acts of decoding external information, not intrinsic states alone.
• Animal consciousness is tied to an evolved, evaluative experience supporting perception-action cycles.
• Understanding consciousness requires focusing on the functional role of information processing in biological systems.