Active Security Control for Switched Systems Under Deception and DoS Attacks Based on Two-Tier Stackelberg Game

Area of Science:

• Control Systems Engineering
• Cybersecurity
• Networked Systems Analysis

Background:

• Networked switched systems (NSSs) face significant security threats from deception and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• Existing security control methods often struggle to address the complex interplay of multiple, concurrent attack vectors.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop an active security control methodology for NSSs under deception and DoS attacks.
• To analyze and mitigate the impact of asynchronous switching and controller output blocking caused by these attacks.
• To ensure the mean square exponential stability of the system despite adversarial actions.

Main Methods:

• Formulation of a two-tier Stackelberg game to model the strategic interactions between deception attackers, controllers, and DoS attackers.
• Incorporation of cost functions for each participant to derive optimal strategies.
• Integration of the average dwell time technique to guarantee system stability.
• Analysis of system behavior under asynchronous switching and controller output blocking scenarios.

Main Results:

• Derivation of optimal strategies for all participants in the Stackelberg game.
• Establishment of conditions for mean square exponential stability of the NSS.
• Quantification of the relationships between deception attacks, DoS attacks, and asynchronous switching behaviors.
• Validation of the proposed active security control methodology through simulations on a switched RLC circuit.

Conclusions:

• The proposed enhanced two-tier Stackelberg game approach effectively addresses security control challenges in NSSs.
• The methodology guarantees system stability while accounting for complex attack scenarios and system dynamics.
• The study provides a robust framework for active security control in vulnerable networked systems.