Countering Authoritarian Behavior in Democracies

Democratic stability hinges on voters' commitment to democratic norms, yet there are many examples of voters' willingness to tolerate politicians who violate such principles. This article examines whether critical responses by other politicians can effectively counter the appeal of political candidates who have engaged in authoritarian behavior. We argue that costly action by fellow partisan politicians can reduce the electoral popularity of authoritarian politicians. We test this in a preregistered conjoint experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in the United Kingdom. The results show that voters are less likely to choose politicians displaying authoritarian behavior, when they are criticized by other legislators, and that such counteractions are particularly effective when they are costly. These findings have important implications, as they show that politicians, especially co-partisans, can play an important role in reducing the appeal of authoritarian politicians.

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-024-09971-5.