Resilient oscillator-based cyberattack detection for distributed secondary control of inverter-interfaced Islanded...

Area of Science:

• Electrical Engineering
• Computer Science
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Microgrids are increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks targeting secondary control mechanisms.
• False Data Injection (FDI) and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks disrupt microgrid stability and performance.
• Existing control strategies struggle to maintain stability under cyber threats.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a robust cyber-resilient strategy for islanded AC microgrids.
• To enhance resilience of frequency regulation and power sharing against cyberattacks.
• To validate the proposed approach across diverse microgrid topologies.

Main Methods:

• Integration of adaptive anomaly detection and hierarchical control mechanisms.
• Simulation analysis using MATLAB/Simulink under various cyberattack scenarios.
• Evaluation of effectiveness against FDI and DoS attacks on communication links.

Main Results:

• Conventional control fails to maintain stability during cyberattacks, causing deviations.
• The proposed approach successfully detects and mitigates cyberattacks.
• System stability and robust operation are restored, ensuring reliable power distribution.

Conclusions:

• The proposed cyber-resilient strategy effectively mitigates cyberattacks in islanded AC microgrids.
• The approach ensures frequency stability and balanced power sharing.
• Validated adaptability across networked, looped-type, and bus-type microgrid configurations.