Near-Field Microwave Sensing for Chip-Level Tamper Detection.

Area of Science:

• Electrical Engineering
• Computer Engineering
• Materials Science

Background:

• Modern microelectronic systems face significant security risks from stealthy chip-level tamper attacks, including hardware Trojans and circuit modifications.
• Traditional tamper detection methods like inspection and side-channel analysis have limitations in scalability, accuracy, and applicability.
• Existing methods may fail to detect subtle physical alterations or require invasive procedures.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a non-invasive, contactless method for detecting physical tampering in microelectronic systems.
• To enhance the security and integrity verification of integrated circuits against hardware attacks.
• To provide a cost-effective and robust solution for physical security of electronic devices.

Main Methods:

• Utilized complementary split-ring resonators (CSRRs) for non-destructive material characterization.
• Deployed CSRRs on chip packages to detect impedance variations in the power delivery network (PDN).
• Monitored changes in the sensor's scattering parameters caused by PDN impedance perturbations due to tampering.

Main Results:

• Demonstrated the detection of various chip-level tamper events on a 28 nm FPGA.
• Showcased the method's ability to detect subtle impedance variations without physical contact or circuit activation.
• Validated the effectiveness of CSRRs in identifying physical integrity breaches.

Conclusions:

• The CSRR-based approach offers a robust and cost-effective solution for physical integrity verification of microelectronic systems.
• This non-invasive technique overcomes the limitations of traditional tamper detection methods.
• The method provides a reliable means to ensure the security of integrated circuits against hardware attacks.