IRS-VLC physical layer security scheme: a dual-strategy against eavesdropping and attacks.

Area of Science:

• Optical Communications
• Cybersecurity
• Wireless Networks

Background:

• Visible Light Communication (VLC) systems offer high bandwidth but face security vulnerabilities.
• Conventional VLC security measures are insufficient against sophisticated eavesdropping and jamming attacks.
• Maintaining adequate illuminance for communication can inadvertently aid eavesdroppers.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a robust physical layer security (PLS) scheme for indoor VLC systems.
• To enhance security against eavesdropping and jamming attacks, even with imperfect channel state information (CSI).
• To reduce illuminance in potential eavesdropping zones without compromising communication quality.

Main Methods:

• Implementation of a non-Lambertian beamforming strategy.
• Integration of intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs) for signal manipulation.
• Analysis of illuminance reduction in targeted areas and Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) under jamming conditions.

Main Results:

• Reduced illuminance in potential eavesdropping areas from 80 lux to 5.2 lux, causing eavesdropping failure.
• Improved jamming resistance, with the proposed scheme achieving a SINR of 40.32 dB compared to 26.13 dB in typical VLC systems (a 54% improvement).
• Demonstrated resilience against jamming attacks and eavesdropping attempts.

Conclusions:

• The proposed PLS scheme significantly enhances the security of VLC systems.
• IRSs and beamforming effectively mitigate eavesdropping and jamming threats in VLC.
• The developed security approach is suitable for sensitive environments requiring robust wireless communication.