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Invisible Leaks: Covert Channel Exploitation in In-Sensor Computing System.

Mashrafi Kajol¹, Md Abdullah Al Rumon², Shehjar Sadhu²

¹University of New Hampshire, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Durham, NH, USA.

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|September 29, 2025

Summary

This summary is machine-generated.

In-sensor computing (ISC) integrates sensing and processing on one chip, but this high integration enables novel security threats. Researchers demonstrate a covert channel attack exploiting ISC's analog nature, highlighting urgent needs for new security defenses.

Keywords:

In-sensor computing covert channel health monitoring privacy

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Area of Science:

Computer Engineering
Cybersecurity
Integrated Circuits

Background:

In-sensor computing (ISC) merges sensing and processing on a single chip, promising reduced latency and power consumption.
The high integration in ISC systems introduces novel vulnerabilities not present in traditional architectures.
Existing security research has not fully explored the attack surface of ISC systems.

Purpose of the Study:

To investigate the feasibility and implications of security attacks on in-sensor computing (ISC) systems.
To demonstrate a covert channel attack leveraging the analog characteristics of ISC.
To raise awareness and encourage the development of defense mechanisms for ISC.

Main Methods:

Developed a covert channel attack exploiting the analog signal properties within an ISC system.
Simulated and analyzed the attack's effectiveness in a realistic application context.
Evaluated the potential consequences of such attacks on ISC system security.

Main Results:

Successfully demonstrated a covert channel attack exploiting the analog nature of ISC.
Showcased the feasibility of such attacks and their severe consequences in practical scenarios.
Identified a new class of security vulnerabilities unique to highly integrated ISC architectures.

Conclusions:

In-sensor computing systems are susceptible to novel covert channel attacks.
The analog nature of ISC presents a unique attack vector that must be addressed.
Further research into robust defense mechanisms is crucial for the secure deployment of emerging ISC technologies.