Resilient event-triggered quasi-synchronization control for CLSs with parameter mismatches under DoS attacks

This paper investigates quasi-synchronization of chaotic Lur'e systems (CLSs) with parameter mismatches under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A resilient memory event-triggered scheme (RMETS) is proposed to mitigate network congestion and attack-induced disruptions. Unlike conventional schemes requiring prior knowledge of attack timing, RMETS employs an acknowledgment (ACK) mechanism to detect packet loss and introduces an ACK-related performance loss term for adaptive adjustment of release probability. Historical release data are further incorporated to refine control updates at critical sampling instants, balancing communication demands with control performance. A co-design of RMETS and a memory-based controller ensures the quasi-synchronization of CLSs within a predefined error bound. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through simulations using Chua's circuit.