The relationship between capacity and credibility: implications for epistemic injustice

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Social Epistemology
• Bioethics

Background:

• Mental capacity assessments are crucial in legal and medical contexts.
• Epistemic injustice, where credibility is unfairly denied, can impact marginalized groups.
• Existing frameworks for capacity assessment may not adequately address epistemic concerns.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze mental capacity assessments through the lens of epistemic injustice.
• To explore how credibility assessments influence capacity determinations.
• To identify potential biases and exclusions in current practices.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis linking mental capacity and epistemic justice.
• Examination of how stereotypes (mental disability, gender, race) affect credibility.
• Analysis of epistemic agency and exclusion in capacity-lack determinations.
• Critique of hermeneutical resources used in capacity assessments.

Main Results:

• Capacity assessments inherently involve evaluating epistemic credibility.
• Biases related to mental disability, gender, and race can inadvertently influence assessments.
• Individuals deemed lacking capacity experience curtailed epistemic agency, leading to exclusion.
• Medical-scientific and legal knowledge may be inadequate for interpreting diverse experiences.

Conclusions:

• Reframing capacity assessments through epistemic justice reveals potential for bias and exclusion.
• Recognizing epistemic factors is vital for fairer capacity determinations.
• Insights offer avenues for legal and practical reforms in capacity assessment.