GNSS Spoofing Detection via Self-Consistent Verification of Receiver's Clock State

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are highly vulnerable to spoofing attacks, which can cause positioning errors and pose serious threats to user receivers. Therefore, the development of efficient and reliable spoofing detection techniques has become an urgent requirement for ensuring GNSS security. In spoofing attacks, attackers introduce additional bias in the Doppler shift. However, detection methods that rely on extracting this deviation from raw measurements suffer from limited practicality, and existing alternative detection schemes based on position, velocity, and time (PVT) information exhibit poor adaptability to diverse scenarios. To address these limitations, this paper proposes a spoofing detection method based on the self-consistency verification of the receiver's clock state (SCV-RCS). Its core statistic is the cumulative difference between the estimated clock bias and the bias obtained by integrating clock drift. By monitoring this consistency, SCV-RCS identifies anomalies in pseudorange and Doppler observations without complex bias extraction or auxiliary hardware, ensuring easy deployment. Simulation and experimental results demonstrate the method's effectiveness across diverse spoofing scenarios. It achieves the fastest alarm delay of ≤2 s while providing continuous alerting capability in full-channel and partial-channel spoofing. This study provides a robust and reliable solution for GNSS receivers operating in complex spoofing environments.