Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions

As security threats emerge, how to protect the highly-dependent infrastructure of modern society has become a great challenge. Previous studies have mostly assumed that attackers are completely rational and well-informed, and have generally considered only a single type of attacker. However, these assumptions are inconsistent with reality, where attackers often have incomplete information and irrational behavior. This paper combines network science and game theory, based on the Bayesian Stackelberg game model, studies the defense strategy under the condition of incomplete information. We especially consider the variation of rationality degree of multi-type attackers, and propose a camouflage network construction model and a strong ɛ equilibrium strategy. In addition, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by experiments. Preventive and protective measures can be taken before an attacker can launch an attack, thus greatly reducing the risk of an attack on an infrastructure network.