Modeling Strategic Intercommunity Connections in Evolutionary Games

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Network Science
• Computational Social Science

Background:

• Traditional evolutionary game theory (EGT) assumes static, well-mixed populations.
• Real-world systems feature agents dynamically forming/breaking connections based on incentives.
• Existing models often overlook the impact of strategic network formation on evolutionary dynamics.

Purpose of the Study:

• To introduce a novel framework integrating EGT with strategic network formation.
• To model the co-evolution of strategies and intercommunity links.
• To analyze how strategic connections influence collective behavior in various games.

Main Methods:

• Developed a strategic connections model (SCM) based on pairwise stability.
• SCM models two-stage optimization for mutual incentives and payoff improvements.
• Applied the framework to prisoner's dilemma, rock-paper-scissors, and congestion games.

Main Results:

• Intercommunity connections significantly reshape population-level outcomes.
• Cooperation emerges and persists in prisoner's dilemma under specific conditions.
• Rock-paper-scissors dynamics are altered, potentially suppressing characteristic cycles.
• Congestion games show improved resource allocation and infrastructure usage.

Conclusions:

• Strategic intercommunity links are critical in shaping collective behavior.
• The framework provides insights into inter/intracommunity dynamics in diverse systems.
• Highlights the importance of considering strategic network formation in evolutionary models.