Thinking of Oneself as Someone: The Structure of Self-Representation

One question we can ask when investigating the nature of self-representation concerns the types of property that must figure in its content. Here, authors have claimed that self-representations must be about spatial, temporal, bodily, or mental properties. However, we can also ask a second question: how do we need to represent a property to self-represent it? I address this latter question. I argue that a distinction between egocentric and allocentric forms of representation-known from spatial cognition-also applies to representations of other kinds of property. I use examples drawn from animal cognition and developmental psychology to show how creatures allocentrically represent their temporal, bodily, and cognitive properties. These representations are minimal self-representations: they represent one's properties so that an explicit differentiation is made between the system and other objects (or between the system's actual and merely possible properties), they are directly linked to behavior and sensation, and they are immune to error through misidentification. The upshot is a view on which different creatures may self-represent more or fewer kinds of property. More substantive forms of self-representation (for instance, as exemplified by neurotypical adult human beings) then require integrated minimal self-representations of the right kinds of property.