Selective encoding of priors for flexible categorization but not Bayesian inference in the frontal eye field

Expectations or prior beliefs about the world have been shown to modulate sensory processing both at the behavioral and neural levels. Bayesian models predict that such priors compensate for input uncertainty to optimize sensory judgments. Although Bayesian behavior is prevalent across sensorimotor systems, the relationship between priors and Bayesian inference is not obligatory. Priors may simply shift one's internal decision boundaries without interacting with sensory uncertainty at all. We recently showed that humans and monkeys use both Bayesian and non-Bayesian strategies when reporting judgments of visual stability across saccades, despite using priors in both cases. While they increased prior use to compensate for internal, movement-driven sensory uncertainty in a Bayesian manner, they decreased prior use when faced with external, visual image uncertainty. The latter, "anti-Bayesian" pattern was best explained by a model in which category boundaries were adjusted by the prior but susceptible to image noise. Here, we recorded neural activity in the frontal eye field (FEF), a prefrontal region important for visuosaccadic behavior, while toggling between subjects' prior use for Bayesian and anti-Bayesian behavior via trial-by-trial manipulation of the two uncertainty conditions. First, we found that FEF activity signaled the priors in both conditions. The prior-related modulation of activity, however, predicted only the anti-Bayesian, categorization behavior. The results suggest that neural activity in the FEF reflects the use of a flexible decision boundary for the perception of visual stability and, more generally, that neural mechanisms for Bayesian inference and visual categorization are dissociable and distributed in the primate brain.