Latent Profile Analysis of Generic Conspiracy Beliefs- Differences in Science Acceptance, Analytical and Intuitive...

The aims of the present study were to (i) identify profiles of belief in conspiracy theories, and to (ii) test whether the obtained profiles differed in analytical (rational ability, rational engagement, Cognitive Reflection Test) and intuitive thinking (experiential ability, experiential engagement), and science denial (vaccine, climate science). In total, 451 participants (Mean age = 30.80, SD = 16.59, 61% female) were recruited from high-schools and social media groups. The participants completed questionnaires and performance tests of the study variables. The Latent Profile Analysis identified four distinct profiles that showed consistent and distinct response patterns over all five subscales of the Generic Conspiracy Belief Scale, with no overlap between the profiles, ranging from low (Profile 1) to strong conspiracy beliefs (Profile 4). Profile 1 was the largest class (38.14%), whilst Profile 4 was the smallest class (8.61%). The analyses further revealed that no differences were found between profiles in analytical thinking, measured by the performance-based cognitive reflection test. However, profile differences were found for self-reported analytical thinking, intuitive thinking, and science denial. Overall, less conspiracy beliefs were accompanied by less intuitive thinking and higher acceptance of climate and vaccine science. Somewhat unexpectedly, participants who held the strongest conspiracy beliefs (Profile 4) as well as those who had the lowest beliefs in conspiracy theories (Profile 1) reported higher levels of analytical thinking, compared with the other two profiles, suggesting that people who most strongly endorse conspiracy theories report high use of both analytical and intuitive thinking styles. A potential explanation may be that conspiracy beliefs initially originate through intuitive thinking, while analytical thinking can be used to maintain and justify these beliefs through, for instance, motivated reasoning.