Member selection in traditional Chinese medicine innovation consortia: an evolutionary game theory approach

In recent years, long and uncertain research and development (R&D) cycles, difficulties in patent protection, and fragmented innovation activities have jointly constrained the traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) industry, making many enterprises hesitant to pursue independent innovation. Despite a relatively complete industrial chain, traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) industry faces persistent challenges in technological innovation and commercialization. Collaborative innovation through TCM innovation consortia has emerged as a strategic mechanism to integrate heterogeneous resources and enhance innovation capacity. Understanding the determinants of member selection and consortium formation dynamics is essential for promoting high-quality development.

This study develops an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality to simulate potential consortium members' decision-making. Key factors-resource complementarity, transaction costs, participant strengths, and third-party involvement-are incorporated to evaluate their impact on stable consortium formation.

Analysis indicates that higher resource complementarity, balanced participant strengths, greater expected returns, and third-party support significantly increase the likelihood of stable consortium formation. Similar mechanisms are observed in international innovation ecosystems, where intermediaries, policy guidance, and cross-boundary partnerships reduce information asymmetries and transaction costs. These findings offer theoretical insights into dynamic member selection and practical guidance for enhancing governance, operational stability, and coordination efficiency in TCM innovation consortia. By learning from global collaboration practices, more effective resource integration and cooperation can strengthen innovation capacity and support the high-quality development of China's TCM industry.