Experimental Evaluation of GNSS Receiver Vulnerability to Spoofing and Jamming Using SDR-Based Testbed

Area of Science:

• Navigation Systems
• Signal Processing
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are critical for modern navigation but susceptible to interference.
• Existing research often overlooks acquisition-phase behavior and reacquisition times post-interference.
• Understanding receiver response to jamming and spoofing is vital for system integrity.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the impact of jamming and spoofing on GNSS receiver acquisition-phase behavior, specifically Time-to-First-Fix (TTFF) and reacquisition times.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of different interference types (narrowband jamming, static/dynamic spoofing) on commercial GNSS receivers.
• To assess the reliability of navigation-fix continuity as an indicator of integrity during spoofing attacks.

Main Methods:

• Development of a repeatable laboratory testbed using software-defined radio (SDR) to emulate GPS L1 and Galileo E1 signals.
• Controlled testing of five commercial GNSS receivers under various interference scenarios.
• Analysis of acquisition-phase metrics (TTFF, reacquisition time) and navigation-fix probabilities during interference.

Main Results:

• Jamming leads to immediate positioning loss and significantly increased reacquisition times.
• Spoofing maintains high navigation-fix probabilities during attacks but introduces persistent, undetected errors.
• Multi-constellation spoofing enhances attack effectiveness, and multi-band receivers show delayed spoof acceptance rather than outright prevention.

Conclusions:

• Navigation-fix continuity alone is insufficient to guarantee integrity during spoofing attacks.
• Jamming and spoofing exhibit distinct impacts on GNSS receiver performance.
• Complementary integrity-monitoring mechanisms are essential for GNSS-dependent systems to ensure reliable navigation.