A Systems-Based Approach for Analyzing Interorganizational Coordination Within Port Risk Control Structures

This study proposes a systems-based analysis approach for analyzing interorganizational coordination in complex sociotechnical systems through the interorganizational risk management coordination taxonomy (IRM-CT). Unlike traditional risk-analysis approaches that primarily focus on intraorganizational controls, probabilistic assessment, or component reliability, the IRM-CT operationalizes interorganizational coordination as a systemic control problem embedded within distributed governance and feedback structures. Building on the STAMP-based Port Risk Control Structure (PRCS), the IRM-CT distinguishes between operational adaptors, which enact coordination in practice, and enabling adaptors, which provide the structural, procedural, and relational conditions that sustain coordination across organizational boundaries. The approach integrates coordination theory, sociotechnical systems thinking, and resilience engineering, embedding coordination within control and feedback loops and evaluating adaptor configurations through three system value conditions: accountability, predictability, and common understanding. A proof-of-concept analysis using the Halifax Port Authority Port Information Guide demonstrates how the IRM-CT identifies adaptor configurations, diagnoses "Supported," "Fragile," and "Orphan" coordination states, and evaluates their contribution to accountability, predictability, and common understanding. The IRM-CT advances systemic risk governance by revealing how authority, codification, and trust interact to sustain safe control. Beyond ports, the proposed approach may be applicable to high-risk sectors such as mining, aviation, and energy, offering a structured means for diagnosing and strengthening interorganizational coordination.