Related Experiment Videos
Causation, compulsion, and involuntariness
1University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia.
The Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
|January 1, 1994
Summary
Causation does not equal compulsion, and neither is an automatic excuse. Many excuses like "irresistible impulse" are better understood as rationality problems, especially when caused internally.
Area of Science:
- Legal Psychology
- Philosophy of Law
- Forensic Psychiatry
Background:
- Distinguishing causation from excuse is crucial in legal and ethical contexts.
- The concept of 'compulsion' as a legal defense is frequently misunderstood.
- Existing frameworks struggle to adequately assess excuses related to volitional control.
Purpose of the Study:
- To clarify the distinction between causation and excuse.
- To analyze the complexities surrounding defenses like 'compulsion' or 'irresistible impulse'.
- To propose a more effective framework for assessing internal causes of excusing conditions.
Main Methods:
- Conceptual analysis of legal and psychological terminology.
- Examination of case law and forensic assessments.
- Critique of current diagnostic and assessment practices for volitional impairments.
Main Results:
- Causation is demonstrated not to be equivalent to compulsion.
- Causation in itself does not constitute an excusing condition.
- Excuses based on internal causes (e.g., 'irresistible impulse') are often poorly understood and assessed.
- Rationality problems offer a more effective lens for assessing these conditions.
Conclusions:
- Legal and forensic professionals must differentiate causation from excuse more rigorously.
- The 'compulsion' defense requires re-evaluation, particularly when rooted in internal factors.
- Assessing excusing conditions through the lens of rationality problems enhances clarity and accuracy in forensic evaluations.