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Blindsight in hindsight
1Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Ohio 45210-0374, USA.
Consciousness and Cognition
|March 1, 1997
Summary
Philosophers misuse blindsight (a neuropsychological phenomenon) in consciousness studies. This paper critiques Dennett and Block, highlighting neglected details like visual sensations, and proposes a refined blindsight model.
Area of Science:
- Neuroscience
- Philosophy of Mind
- Cognitive Science
Background:
- Philosophers increasingly use neuroscience for insights into the mind.
- Neuropsychology offers empirical data, with blindsight being a key phenomenon.
- Previous philosophical accounts have simplified or misrepresented blindsight.
Purpose of the Study:
- To examine the alleged misuse of blindsight by philosophers Daniel Dennett and Ned Block.
- To analyze how their interpretations impact models of human consciousness.
- To offer a more comprehensive understanding of blindsight and consciousness.
Main Methods:
- Critical analysis of philosophical accounts of blindsight by Dennett and Block.
- Examination of empirical complexities of blindsight, including subjective visual sensations.
- Explication of the implications for consciousness models.
Main Results:
- Dennett and Block's accounts of blindsight overlook crucial details, such as subjects' reports of visual sensations.
- These omissions have significant negative consequences for their respective theories of consciousness.
- The misrepresentation hinders both scientific and philosophical progress in understanding blindsight and consciousness.
Conclusions:
- Philosophical interpretations of blindsight by Dennett and Block are flawed due to neglected complexities.
- A more nuanced model of blindsight is needed, incorporating subjective experiences.
- Accurate understanding of blindsight is vital for advancing theories of consciousness.