Non-consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status

Recently, several outstanding discussions of the structure of non-consequentialism have appeared. Two of these are Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality and a pair of articles by Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing" and "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect." I would like to examine several related issues discussed by these authors. Another outstanding work to which I will refer in this article, but not discuss at great length, is Judith Jarvis Thomson's The Realm of Rights. The general topic with which I shall be concerned is the structure of a non-consequentialist moral theory. Non-consequentialism has two important features. In a non-consequentialist moral theory, (1) there is a permission not to maximize overall best consequences (this is sometimes referred to as an option), and (2) there are constraints on promoting overall best consequences (for example, we must not kill one innocent, non-threatening person for his organs to save five others). I shall use the works by Kagan, Quinn, and Thomson to help characterize further the elements of the non-consequentialist structure and to justify them.