Thinking about possible people: a comment on Tooley and Rachels

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Ethics
• Bioethics
• Moral Philosophy

Background:

• Philosophical debate exists on the ethics of procreation, particularly concerning the asymmetry between the wrongness of creating a miserable life and the potential good of creating a happy one.
• Michael Tooley's rights-based explanation posits that creating a life not worth living wrongs an individual, while Stuart Rachels critiques this for counterintuitive implications.
• Discussions often involve hypothetical scenarios, such as the existence of possible individuals and their moral status.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate Stuart Rachels' objection to Michael Tooley's rights-based account of procreation ethics.
• To demonstrate the inadequacy of both Rachels' criticism and Tooley's defense due to semantic issues concerning possible individuals.
• To explore the implications of these semantic issues for broader ethical debates.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of the semantic assumptions underlying philosophical arguments about possible individuals.
• Critique of existing rights-based and consequentialist accounts of procreation ethics.
• Examination of counterexamples, including those involving potential twins, to test ethical theories.

Main Results:

• Both Rachels' critique of Tooley and Tooley's defense are found to be unsuccessful.
• The core issue lies in the failure to properly address the semantics of naming and referring to possible individuals.
• This semantic oversight misleads ethical reasoning regarding actions involving potential people.

Conclusions:

• A deeper understanding of the semantics of possible individuals is crucial for resolving ethical dilemmas in procreation.
• The findings have significant implications for debates on abortion, population policy, and embryo experimentation.
• Further philosophical inquiry into the nature of potential persons and their moral standing is warranted.