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Credible threats and promises.

John M McNamara1, Alasdair I Houston

  • 1Department of Mathematics, University of Bristol, University Walk, Bristol BS8 1TW, UK. john.mcnamara@bristol.ac.uk

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences
|December 24, 2002
PubMed
Summary

Information about a partner in evolutionary games can be disadvantageous. Players can manipulate resources to make credible threats, influencing trust and commitment in strategic interactions.

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Area of Science:

  • Evolutionary Game Theory
  • Behavioral Economics
  • Game Theory

Background:

  • Information asymmetry influences strategic decision-making in two-player games.
  • The concepts of credible threats and promises are crucial in understanding strategic interactions.
  • Previous research explored the evolution of trust and commitment, but the role of information and credible threats requires further investigation.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate the implications of possessing information about a partner's behavior in two-player evolutionary games.
  • To analyze the conditions under which credible threats and promises can be established and maintained.
  • To extend the understanding of the evolution of trust and commitment in strategic interactions.

Main Methods:

  • Development of a simple desertion model in evolutionary games.
  • Analysis of how information about a partner's behavior affects strategic choices.
  • Mathematical modeling to explore the manipulation of reserves for credible threats.

Main Results:

  • Information about a partner's behavior can be disadvantageous in certain evolutionary game scenarios.
  • Players can create credible threats of desertion by manipulating their reserves.
  • Conditions are identified where assuming a partner's cooperative behavior is advantageous, even if not immediately self-beneficial.

Conclusions:

  • Information in evolutionary games can be a double-edged sword, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes.
  • The ability to make credible threats is a key factor in shaping strategic interactions and fostering cooperation.
  • This study contributes to understanding the evolution of trust and commitment by highlighting the role of strategic information management and credible commitments.

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