Wanted: a new psychology of exemplars

Present-day exemplar theory faces difficult challenges, and important questions have arisen about the kinds of exemplar effects and processes that are empirically supported, and about the kind of exemplar theory that could still be constructive. One question concerns whether exemplar generalization in memory and categorization is broad and collective--extending to many related exemplars stored in memory--or whether it is focused and singular--extending only to highly similar (nearly identical) exemplars. The present article considers this continuum from broad to narrow generalization. I demonstrate that in prominent memory and category tasks--tasks in which exemplar theory predicts broad generalization--generalization is in psychological reality very tightly focused. These demonstrations could ground a new, productive exemplar theory that is true to psychological process as humans conduct themselves in memory and category tasks. This new psychology may actually reprise the traditional exemplar theory that predated our sophisticated, mathematical exemplar models.