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Evidential reasoning in the prisoner's dilemma
Melissa Acevedo1, Joachim I Krueger
1University of Miami, USA.
The American Journal of Psychology
|November 1, 2005
Summary
Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be explained by expectations of reciprocity. When players believe others will cooperate, they are more likely to cooperate themselves, challenging purely rational self-interest models.
Area of Science:
- Behavioral Economics
- Game Theory
- Social Psychology
Background:
- Classic game theory posits defection as the rational choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, maximizing individual gain.
- However, empirical observations show frequent cooperation, deviating from purely self-interested rational choice models.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate the role of expectations of reciprocal behavior in driving cooperation within the Prisoner's Dilemma.
- To differentiate the impact of generalized reciprocity expectations versus specific opponent cooperation expectations on cooperative behavior.
Main Methods:
- Experiment 1: Manipulated participants' expectations of reciprocity to observe its effect on cooperation rates.
- Experiment 2: Manipulated participants' expectations of their opponent's cooperation to assess its association with their own cooperative choices.
Main Results:
- Cooperation rates increased monotonically with experimentally manipulated expectations of reciprocity (Experiment 1).
- Experimentally manipulated expectations of opponent cooperation did not correlate with increased rates of cooperation (Experiment 2).
Conclusions:
- Expectations of generalized reciprocity significantly promote cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
- Findings support a payoff maximization model incorporating social expectations and have implications for understanding social value orientation.