Dissociating mental states related to doing nothing by means of fMRI pattern classification

Most juridical systems recognize intentional non-actions - the failure to render assistance - as intentional acts by regarding them as in principle culpable. This raises the fundamental question whether intentional non-actions can be distinguished from simply not doing anything. Classical GLM analysis on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data reveals that not doing anything is associated with resting state brain areas whereas intentionally non-acting is associated with brain activity in left inferior parietal lobe and left dorsal premotor cortex. By means of pattern classification we quantify the accuracy with which we can distinguish these two mental states on the basis of brain activity. In order to identify brain regions that harbour a distributed, overlapping representation of voluntary non-actions and the decision not to act we performed pattern classification on brain areas that did not appear in the GLM contrasts. The prediction rate is not reduced and we show that the prediction relies mostly on brain areas that have been associated with action production and motor imagery as supplementary motor area, right inferior frontal gyrus and right middle temporal area (V5/MT). Hence our data support the implicit assumption of legal practice that voluntary non-action shares important features with overt voluntary action.