Intertemporal Disagreement and Empirical Slippery Slope Arguments

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Argumentation
• Ethical Reasoning
• Logic

Background:

• Slippery slope arguments are common but often criticized for speculative empirical premises.
• These arguments typically follow a structure: initial act leads to a more extreme act, which should be avoided, thus the initial act should be avoided.
• Existing critiques focus on the empirical strength of the predicted consequences.

Purpose of the Study:

• To identify a novel flaw in the standard form of slippery slope arguments.
• To argue that the empirical premises supporting the predicted future act can undermine the normative premise.
• To explore the dialectical implications and potential defenses against this critique.

Main Methods:

• Logical analysis of the structure of slippery slope arguments.
• Examination of the relationship between empirical predictions and normative conclusions.
• Identification of specific conditions under which the critique is most effective.

Main Results:

• The truth of the empirical premises (i.e., that the predicted extreme act will occur) provides evidence against the normative premise (that the extreme act should be avoided).
• If a future act is predicted and likely to occur, this suggests it may be normatively permissible or even desirable.
• This challenges the conclusion that the initial act should be prohibited.

Conclusions:

• Standard slippery slope arguments may be fallacious not due to weak empirical claims, but because strong empirical claims support the falsity of their normative claims.
• The predicted occurrence of a future act can serve as a prima facie reason to view that act positively.
• Further premises may be needed to defend slippery slope arguments against this logical challenge.