A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary biology
• Sociology
• Criminology

Background:

• Cooperation in human societies, particularly among non-relatives, often requires mechanisms to suppress competition.
• Policing and punishment are key repression-of-competition mechanisms crucial for maintaining social order.
• Economic games demonstrate that punishing defectors enforces cooperation in human groups.

Purpose of the Study:

• To test evolutionary policing theory using a real-world example of police institutions in Switzerland.
• To examine the relationship between social similarity, policing effort, and crime rates across Swiss cantons.
• To determine if policing effectively enforces cooperation in diverse social environments.

Main Methods:

• Comparative analysis of policing effort, per capita crime rates, and social similarity (as a proxy for genetic relatedness) across 26 Swiss cantons.
• Statistical examination of correlations between similarity and crime, similarity and policing, and policing and crime rates.
• Testing predictions derived from evolutionary policing theory regarding social environment cues and behavioral adjustments.

Main Results:

• Crime rates negatively correlated with social similarity among citizens, even when controlling for policing efforts.
• Policing effort negatively correlated with social similarity, indicating more policing is needed in less similar societies.
• Increased policing efforts were associated with reduced crime rates, confirming policing's role in enforcing cooperation.

Conclusions:

• Findings strongly support evolutionary policing theory, demonstrating that humans adjust cheating and policing behaviors based on social environmental cues.
• Social similarity plays a significant role in self-restraint and the need for external enforcement mechanisms like policing.
• Policing institutions are vital for maintaining cooperation in diverse human societies where genetic relatedness is low.