Unfinished business: efforts to define dual-use research of bioterrorism concern

Biotechnological research poses a special security problem because of the duality between beneficial use and misuse. In order to find a balance between regulating potentially dangerous research and assuring scientific advancement, a number of assessments have tried to define which types of research are especially open to misuse and should therefore be considered dual-use research of special concern requiring rigorous oversight. So far, there has been no common understanding of what such activities are. Here we present a review of 27 assessments focusing on biological dual-use issues published between 1997 and 2008. Dual-use research activities identified by these assessments as being of special concern were compiled and compared. Moreover, from these 27 assessments, the primary research publications explicitly identified as examples of concerning research activities were extracted and analyzed. We extracted a core list of 11 activities of special concern and show that this list does not match with the reasons why primary research publications were identified as being of special concern. Additionally, we note that the 11 activities identified are not easily conducted or replicated, and therefore the likelihood of their being used in a high-tech mass casualty bioterrorism event should be reevaluated.